In this paper we present a systematic study of abductive consequence relations. We show that a monotone abductive consequence relation satis es the properties of a cumulative monotonic system as de ned by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor when the disjunction of all abductive explanations is the explanation used to justify the observations. We also show that, in general, for this class of abductive consequence relations the Or rule does not hold. We present an example that shows that when there are preferences between di erent abductive explanations monotonicity does not hold. We show that non-monotonic abductive systems preserve a partial version of rational monotonicity and in fact are very similar to rational relations. We also present semantic characterizations of both monotonic and non-monotonic abductive systems in terms of cumulative models as de ned by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor.
Introduction
Abduction is the process of nding explanations for observable e ects in the world. A typical abductive process is the selection of a disease or set of diseases as explanation for a series of symptoms. Most diagnosis system performs some kind of abduction to explain observations. There are other situations, not necessarily involving diagnosis, where an intelligent reasoner may opt to use abduction to draw conclusions. For example, from the implication: rained last night ! grass is wet (1) and the observation the grass is wet we may hypothesize that it rained last night. Generally speaking, there are two parts in an abductive framework ( ; Ab): The domain theory of laws about the world and a distinguish set of symbols Ab, called abducibles, from where the set of possible explanations AbForm will be de ned. We will assume to be a consistent set of sentences in a nite propositional language L and Ab a set of propositional letters from L. Any formula built using only letters from Ab will be an abducible formula in AbForm. Given an observation , the process of abduction is usually de ned ( 14, 17, 3, 11, 20, 4] ) as the task of nding a consistent subset of AbForm such that ` . In our example above, will be the implication (1), will be grass is wet and the set frained last nightg. However, this formal description covers only part of the e ects one can obtained by abduction. Suppose, for example that also contains the formula: rained last night ! do not bike to work (2) In this case the explanation for the grass is wet has also as a consequence that we will not use the bike to go to work. This second component of abduction can be also observed in a diagnostic process where assuming a particular disease to explain certain symptoms can trigger as consequence actions for treatment of the disease or actions to perform tests to con rm the hypothesis.
So far, the study of abduction has tried to describe how explanations are drawn and has taken little consideration on the consequences of explanations. 1 If we want to consider these consequences we may start by de ning a consequence relation based on an abductive framework as follows.
De nition 1.1 Let ( ; Ab) be an abductive framework. We will say that a formula is an abductive consequence of , `A b , if and only if ` , where is the set of abducible formulas selected to explain (and is consistent).
Notice that De nition 1.1 does not specify how to select the set of explanations . The properties of`A b will depend on the way this selection is done. When is the cautious explanation of (i.e. the disjunction of all possible explanations), `A b says that every explanation of is an explanation of . Hence, in a symptom/disorder model, the abduction process says that every cause of has normally as a symptom or consequence too; equivalently, normally each time the symptom is observed, the symptom is also present. If there are preferences among the explanations, then `A b says the most likely (i.e. the preferred) explanation of is normally an explanation of . We say \normally" since`A b has a \conditional nature", which is due to the fact that our domain theory is incomplete. We will see that when the reasoner has preferences among explanations, then the associated consequence relation will not be monotonic (it will be a modi cation of`A b as given by 1.1). The reasoner epistemic state is considered during the abduction process. This extension to the standard notion of abduction was studied by Boutilier and Becher in 2] in the context of nding explanations to observations. However, our emphasis is more on the consequence relation implicit in abductive reasoning rather than in the selection of the explanations.
Several researchers have studied abstract properties of non-monotonic consequence relations (see for instance 6, 7, 15, 16, 19] The contribution of this paper is a classi cation of abductive consequence relations according to the systems de ned in 15] and 16]. We show that a monotone abductive consequence relation satis es the properties of a cumulative monotonic system as de ned in Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor 15] only when the explanation selected to justify the observations is the disjunction of all the abducible explanations. We also show that in general for this class of abductive consequence relations the Or rule does not hold. We also present an example that shows that when there are preferences between di erent abductive explanations monotonicity does not hold. In fact, we will show that the use of preferences will always force the consequence relation to be non-monotonic. In Section 3, we show that non-monotonic abductive systems preserve a partial version of rational monotonicity and that they are very similar to rational relations (in the sense of 16]). We also present semantic characterizations of both cumulative and non-monotonic abductive systems in terms of cumulative models as de ned in 15]. In the last section we have some conclusions and directions of research.
Monotone and cumulative abductive reasoning
In the absence of extra information, the selection of the correct set of explanations for a formula in an abductive framework leads to a formula equivalent to the disjunction of all possible explanations. This formula is called the cautious explanation and can be formally de ned as follows.
De nition 2.1 Let ( ; Ab) be an abductive framework, an abducible formula is called an abductive explanation of a formula if f g is consistent and f g` . The cautious explanation of is de ned to be the disjunction of all the abductive explanations of in ( ; Ab). We will denote this explanation by F c ( ). In case there is no explanation for we let F c ( ) =?. In general, a selection function with respect to ( ; Ab) will be any function F that maps a formula into an abducible formula F( ) such that:
(i) For all , fF ( )g` and fF ( )g is consistent. In case there is no abductive explanation of then F( ) =?.
(ii) If` $ then`F ( ) $ F( ).
Let us recall that the underlying language is a nite propositional language. In particular, this implies that the cautious explanation is well de ned. Also notice that clearly F c satis es the conditions in 2.1. Condition (i) makes F a selection function, since it selects an explanation for . (ii) says that the syntax of is irrelevant when selecting one of its explanation.
Based on this selection functions we can de ne precisely a consequence relation associated with an abductive framework.
De nition 2.2 Let ( ; Ab) an abductive framework and F a selection function w.r.t.
( ; Ab). We will say that a formula is an F-abductive consequence of (and will write `F ) i fF ( )g` . When F = F c we will denote this consequence relation by` since the selection of explanations only depends on .
There are other properties of the cautious explanations that can be obtained from 2.1. We collect three of them in the following fact. There are other rules that follow from the system C ( 15] ), and therefore they will hold and 0 happen to have the same set of possible explanations, then and 0 will have the same`F-consequences. This might seem a trivial observation, however, the point we want to stress is that this property of`F follows from the requirement that`F is a Cumulative consequence relation. It is also saying that once we know the cautious explanation of , F will select an abductive formula based on the cautious explanation independently of . Thus, the observation also says that it su ces to know F restricted to AbForm.
We will continue now presenting some other principles which have been studied in the context on non-monotonic reasoning. We will concentrate on the cumulative relation` .
Cautious Monotony is the weakest form of monotony that has been considered in the literature. There are various ways to state Monotony. In 15] Before we comment about this last rule, observe that from 2.3 (iii) we have that is an explanation of i ` . The rule Ab-Or is important because it says that when and 0 are both explanations of then _ 0 is also an explanation of .
There might be an explanation of _ that is not a \con rmed" explanation of either or 2 and therefore it is \natural" to expect that the Or rule fails in general. A situation where the Or rule fails is illustrated in the following example. In this case, although formulas and abductively entail a formula , from the observation _ we can not draw any speci c conclusions. When we observe that the engine starts we conclude that the battery is ok and if we observe that the engine does not start then we conclude that the battery is not ok, but notice that in either case we are assuming that we have tried to start the engine (otherwise it is pointless to look for an explanation) and therefore we must have had the keys. This extra information is not available if we just claim that we observe that either the engine starts or it does not start.
2
Under the presence of the rules in C, Monotony is equivalent to the following rule ( 15] However, without the Or rule, Contraposition is stronger than Monotony ( 15] ). Sincè does not satis es the Or rule then we only get the following form of contraposition: If is an abducible formula and ` then : ` : . In words, it says that if a symptom is not observed, then none of the disorders that normally cause can be present. However, sometimes we only can nd an explanation for the presence of a symptom but not for the absence of it. 3 This is the reason why full contraposition fails, since even if we know that the expected cause of is (and therefore we abductively get that ` ), we can not say that the absence of implies that should not be observed (i.e. : ` : ).
The following example shows that we can not have full contraposition. The main property that distinguishes` from other consequence relations is that the consequences with respect to` of a formula depend on the explanations of rather than on alone. In order to express this property we will introduce an abstract notion of cautious explanation with respect to an arbitrary consequence relation j .
De nition 2.9 Let j be a consequence relation and ( ; Ab) an abductive framework. The Notice that we only have an indirect reference to in the previous de nition. The reason is that is expected to be \built-in" j . For instance, if we let j be de ned by f g` , then F j c is exactly F c (as de ned in 2.1).
The reader may feel that there is unnecessary generality in the new de nition of the cautious explanation, especially because of the use of an abstract consequence relation j . The reason to move to this level of generality is because, as we will see, the most interesting abductive consequence relations will need to be non-monotonic. In other words, even if we maintain the notion of explanation in the form of f g` , after including preferences among explanations, we will end up with a non-monotonic consequence relation. Hence, by not imposing any constraints on j in De nition 2.9 we will be able to use the same de nition of cautious selection functions for monotonic and non-monotonic consequence relations. Now we can express the abductive nature of` as follows: (Abductive axiom (AA)) A consequence relation j is said to satisfy the abductive axiom if j F j c ( ) for every formula . In particular, all conclusions made using j have to be based on abducible formulas.
(3) The following observations may help to clarify the content of the abductive axiom. Let j be any cumulative consequence relation that satis es the Ab-Or rule. First, given two explanations and 0 of a formula (i.e. j ), it is clear that _ 0 is also an explanation of (by the Ab-Or rule). If we want to be extremely cautious about our claims, we should prefer _ 0 over or 0 as an explanation of , since the former is less speci c than the latter. On the other hand, one way to compare two explanations is by looking at their consequences. Let us say that an explanation 0 of is as good as another explanation , denoted by 0 , if C( 0 ) = C( _ 0 ). In words, we say that the explanation 0 is as good as the explanation because, after all, the conclusions we could draw using the less speci c explanation _ 0 are the same ones we would get by using the more speci c explanation 0 . Notice that if 0 then _ 0 j 0 and also that is not antisymmetric. This relation (or a variant of it) has been used in 15, 16, 7, 10] and it has reminiscences of the simplicity criterion for selection of explanations in 17]. Now, we rephrase the abductive axiom as follows: can be abductively deduced from if and only if for any abductive explanation of there is an explanation 0 of as good as such that follows abductively from 0 .
The following fact is obvious from the de nition of` .
Fact 2.11 The consequence relation` satis es the abductive axiom.
In general, can be considered to contain the world's current laws used by the reasoner to justify explanations and draw conclusions. Hence, for every 2 and every , we have ` . This can be understood as saying that must hold in every state considered by the reasoner as a possible state of a airs. In particular, this implies that when ` ! , then ` holds (this follows easily using And and Right Weakening). Also, it implies that if f g is inconsistent, then ` ?. The converse is not true in general (for instance, when has no explanation), however it holds for those abducible formulas that are consistent with . We will state it as a separate rule, since it will be needed in the sequel.
(Ab-Consistency) If is an abducible formula and j ? then f g is inconsistent. In 10] a similar axiom is called \Preservation of Consistency". This condition will be also re ected in the semantic side of the representation theorem.
Since` satis es the rules of a cumulative system we can present a semantic characterization of` based on simple cumulative models as (i) j satis es the rules of system CM (i.e. it is a cumulative monotonic relation), the rule Ab-Or, the abductive axiom, Ab-consistency and the following constraint: For every 2 and every , j .
(ii) There is a simple cumulative model W = (S; l) such that j =j W where S is the collection of abducible formulas consistent with , for every ; 0 2 S we have l( ) Mod( f g), l( _ 0 ) = l( ) l( 0 ) and l( ) \ Mod( 0 ) l( 0 ).
(iii) There is a domain theory 0 such that for every abducible formula , f g is consistent if and only if 0 f g is consistent, and j =` 0 .
Proofs of theorems can be found in the appendix. However, we should point out that Theorem 2.13 is a corollary of a more general result presented in the next section.
Let us make some remarks about conditions (ii) and (iii) in the previous theorem. The function l is giving the intended meaning of the abducible formulas in S. In other words, models in l( ) are those models of that the reasoner thinks are relevant, appropriated, normal, etc., and only those models will be considered. In our case, they have to be models of f g. Thus, a limiting case in the previous theorem is when l( ) = Mod( f g), which corresponds to j =` . However, it could be that l( ) does not include all models of Mod( f g). In this case 0 contains extra constraints that forces to leave out of l( ) some of those models. Hence, the axioms listed in (i) do not determine uniquely the domain theory used by the agent to draw conclusions and justify explanations, although the domain theory 0 in (iii) must contain and both have to determine the same set of consistent explanations (i.e. f g is consistent i 0 f g is consistent). The last condition in (ii) above says that if a normal model of is also a model of 0 then it has to be a normal model (of 0 ). The extra condition is necessary in order to get the rule Ab-Or. We recall here that in general a simple cumulative model does not induce a relation that satis es Or (in fact, in 15] in order to get the Or rule l(s) was restricted to contain only one model).
So far, we have studied abductive reasoning assuming that there are no preferences among the explanations. However, for the most interesting situations this is not the case. We will present next an example that shows that there are consequence relations naturally de ned using abductive reasoning that are not represented by simple cumulative models, i.e., that are not monotonic.
Consider the following scenario: Lisa lives in a high-rise and parks her car in the 16-oor parking garage of her building. One morning, Lisa was looking for her car and did not nd it where she thought she left it the night before. She considered the possibility that she was in the wrong oor and went to the next oor. There was also the possibility that the car was stolen and she must had called the police, but Lisa looked for the elevator and went to the next oor instead before taking the extreme decision of calling the police. We could model part of her domain theory as follows: 3 Putting some order in the explanations
As we have shown in (2.4), in order to have a well behaved consequence relation one must be careful in the criteria used to select explanations. We have shown that the selection function should select a formula from a set of abducibles explanations of , based only on F c ( ). This happens, for instance, when there is an order of the abducible formulas and F( ) picks the -minimal explanations of . The formalisms presented in this section will follow this idea. Furthermore, the order will be a possibility ordering ( 6] ) over the abducible formulas. A consequence relation can be seen as an order over the set of formulas, and conversely, some orders (epistemic entrenchment, possibility ordering or preferential orders, etc.) are a way of encoding an inference relation (see 10, 6, 7] ). There is no di erence with our approach to abductive consequence relations. The preference relation among abducible formulas will be a possibility ordering and its associated inference relation will be part of the abductive consequence relation. Hence, the order among the abducible formulas can be recuperated from the consequence relation. It has been shown that consequence relations based on orders are not monotonic. In Lisa's example, this is equivalent to say that she is using a non-monotonic consequence relation 4 as a background inference relation. Another example that shows the non-monotonicity nature of abduction with preferences among the explanations is the following. In Lisa's situation we have that :right oor j :stolen car (\normally, when Lisa is not in the right oor, her car has not been stolen"), because this is a way of expressing that she prefers :right oor over stolen car. But, on the other hand, this should not imply that :right oor^stolen car is a contradiction, i.e., Lisa's reasoning is not monotonic.
We will introduce the class of models we use to capture preferences among the explanations. This will be done by means of an order among the models of the domain theory which will translate into an order among the explanations. We will use the following notion of cumulative model:
De nition 3. The di erence between cumulative models and simple cumulative models is that in the latter there is no relation among the states. In the case under consideration, the relation will be a pre-order that encodes the reasoner preferences between explanations.
We will use a particular type of cumulative models. Let ( ; Ab) be an abductive framework and suppose we are given a total pre-order 7 The strict relation is de ned as usual by 0 i 0 and 0 6 . It is clear that is asymmetric.
The motivation behind this choice of l and comes from the theory of belief revision (see Section x4). In fact is a reversed possibility ordering (which is a dual notion of epistemic entrenchment, see 10] and 6]).
De nition 3.2 Let ( ; Ab) be an abductive framework and S, l and be de ned as before.
We call the cumulative model W = (S; l; ) an abductive cumulative model. Abductive cumulative models are actually ordered models (i.e., is a transitive relation), as we will show below. Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor showed in 15] that the consequence relation de ned by an ordered model satis es the rules of C together with the rule Loop (see below). This new system is called CL. We will see that when W is an abductive cumulative model then j W has even more properties than just the system CL.
We state now other rules that are studied in 15]. We will also show that these rules (or partial version of them) are satis ed by j W .
(Loop) F( ) is the cautious explanation of with respect to j W . By de nition of j W we have C( ) = C(F 0 ( )) and also C( ) = C(F( )) (this says that the abductive axiom holds). In other words, the cautious explanation of (with respect to j W ) is j W -equivalent to a more speci c explanation, namely F 0 ( ). It also follows from the proof that C( ) = C(F( )), for every abducible formula , and in fact Mod(C( )) = l( ). This is to say, the original interpretation of an abductive formula given by l is preserved.
We actually have a representation theorem for this kind of consequence relations as we will show next. We introduce the following notion, which correspond in our setting to the rational consequence relation of Lehmann and Magidor. De nition 3.6 A consequence relation j will be called an abductive rational relation if it satis es all the properties listed in the conclusion of Theorem 3.5.
Remark 3.7 When the premises in the relation j W are abducible formulas the relation has all the properties of a rational consequence relation. In particular, we have the following two rules which were shown in 15] to hold for any rational consequence relation. Let 
The proof is in the appendix. However, as in other proofs of representation theorems of this kind ( 16, 10, 7] ), the heart of the proof consists of nding an order derived from a consequence relation j as in the hypothesis of the theorem. So let us indicate how is de ned. Following 15] , an interpretation N is called normal if there is an abducible formula such that N j= C( ). From one of the hypotheses we get that in particular normal interpretations are models of . We will de ne only on normal interpretations, and then the rest of the models of will be located above any normal interpretation. Let Remark 3.9 Notice that when is the empty domain theory and Ab is the set of all propositional letters then j W is a rational consequence relation. Notice also that in this case S will be the set of all consistent formulas and will be (the strict part of) a reversed possibility order (see 6, 10] for de nitions, references and its connection with expectation orders). As in 7] it can be shown that j W i ^: .
Connection with Belief revision
Belief revision is the process of changing the beliefs an agent has in order to incorporate incoming information (which might contradict the old one). The best known formalism for revision theory is the so called AGM postulates 1]. Let K be the belief set of an agent (for instance K could be identi ed with a propositional theory) and suppose that the new incoming information is represented by a formula . The revision of K with is denoted by K . It is natural to assume that K is also a belief set (i.e. closed under logical consequences) and obviously that 2 K . The AGM postulates impose other non trivial conditions on in order to make minimal the changes it performs in K. For instance, if is consistent with K then K Cn(K f g). There is also a semantic characterization of these operators that is equivalent to the postulates. This characterization says that the operators must induce an order among the interpretations of the language. The order intends to capture the \distance" of the interpretations from the models of K. The revision operator must select the \closest" interpretations to the models of K that model as the models of the revised belief set. It has been shown by G ardenfors and Makinson 9 ] that a revision operator is a consequence relation in disguise (and vice versa, some consequence relations can be represented as those coming from revision operators). More precisely, we can de ne j K if 2 K .
In words, the agent is willing to conclude from in the case that belongs to the revised belief set obtained after is incorporated into K (using the revision operator ). In 9] it is shown that j K is a rational consequence relation. This is a very interesting result, since it shows that the AGM postulates and some of the axioms for non-monotonic consequence relations are \two sides of the same coin".
Our original motivation to study abductive consequence relations came from the fact that in revision theory it is possible to use abductive reasoning to revise a belief set. This approach was used in 18] to provide a notion of abductive revision operators. The idea is that given an abductive framework ( ; Ab) and a belief set K that contains we can incorporate a formula using abduction as the basic reasoning mechanism. The operators so de ned have properties that resemble the AGM postulates. It can be shown that if a is an abductive revision operator and we let j a when 2 K a , then j a is an abductive rational relation. The operators a are represented by total pre-orders over Mod( ) and this provides the intuition behind the de nition of and l in the notion of an abductive cumulative models de ned in Section 3.
Conclusions and further remarks
We have presented a study of consequence relations that model some form of abductive reasoning. We have divided our presentation in two cases: Monotone and non-monotone following ideas from 15, 16] . Even though the monotonic case seems to be of lesser im-portance, its simplicity allowed us to introduce easily the basic features of abduction that we have chosen as the key postulates of our consequence relation. For instance: (1) The restricted form of the Or rule that we have called Ab-Or. This rules merely says that if an observation has and 0 as explanation then _ 0 is also an explanation. It is important to recall that the failure of the full Or-rule means that, in general, we do not ask that the preferred explanation of a disjunctive fact _ has to be an explanation of either or . In other words, the process of explaining _ might be a completely di erent task than that of explaining or . (2) Even more important, perhaps, is the Abductive Axiom AA since it seems to capture the \essence" of the notion of abduction we are considering. This postulate simply says that a form of reasoning de ned in terms of a consequence relation j can be called abductive when from every observation one is able to infer the disjunction of all possible explanation of , where the notion of explanation is de ned based on j . From the view point of abduction when it is understood as the inference to the best explanation, AA is a weak requirement. However, as the representation theorem shows, AA together with the rest of the rationality postulates capture a very precise notion of preference among explanations.
There are some natural questions that emerge from our results. The representation theorem presented in Section 3 ordered the models to encode the preferences among the explanations. But note that in Lisa's example the order was generated not based on semantic considerations but on an order over the explanations. Previous studies of non-monotonic consequence relations have considered the use of expectation or possibility orders among the formulas to generate consequence relations (see 10, 7, 6] ). We are currently preparing an article where these issues are studied in more detail. In particular, it will include the study of relations of the form`F, where F is de ned based on orders over sets of formulas.
The study of these relations will bring closer our approach of abduction to other approaches in the literature (for instance, the work of Cialcea and Pirri 3] , where they study properties of the relation \ is a preferred explanation of ").
Another open question is how to deal with in nite languages. The main obstacle is that the cautious explanation is ill-de ned and thus AA is meaningless. However, there is a way to state AA that avoids the problem of de ning the cautious selection function. Another question is up to which extend a consequence relation determines the abductive framework. For instance, is the set of abducibles or the domain theory uniquely determined by j ?. Some results about those questions will be presented elsewhere. Another limitation of the abductive consequence relations presented here is that when a formula does not have explanations the set of abductive consequences of is inconsistent. Hence, consistency is not preserved even when and are consistent. An alternative to attack this limitation would be to modify the abductive framework by expanding the language with new abducible propositional letters and extending the domain theory in order to have explanations for more formulas than in the original theory. The procedure can be seen as a kind of completion for the theory to have explanations for every formula. 8 This approach has been explored in 14] and also in 12] but restricted to logic programming type of theories. How exactly we could de ne this completion is an open question.
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A A non-cumulative abductive relation
The following example shows that when F is not the cautious explanation then`F does not necessarily satis es the rule Cut and Cautious Monotony. We have shown that if F is the cautious selection function then the relation`F satis es the system C. Let Ab = fa; bg and de ne F(p) = a, F(p^r) = b, F( ) = for every 2 AbForm and extends F to the other formulas in such a way that F becomes a selection function for (i.e. (i) and (ii) in 2.1 hold). Then it is easy to check that p`F a, p`F r, but p^r 6 F a. That is to say, Cautious Monotony does not hold. Similarly, p^r`F b but p 6 F b, thus Cut does not hold either. Notice that even if we select a di erent function G such that G(p) = a _ b, which seems to be more natural, and also we let G(p^r) = b, then now we do not have problems with Cautious Monotony, however Cut still fails: p^r`G b, p`G r but p 6 G b (we just have p`G (a _ b)).
B Proofs
The proof of the main result uses ideas from similar representation theorems for consequence relations 16, 10, 7] . The original idea to de ne the order of Mod( ) came from the proof of the representation theorem for AGM operators given in 13]. The following fact will show to be useful.
Fact B.1 Let and 0 be in S. We will show rst some facts that will be used later. Some of them are well known, we will include the proofs for the sake of completeness. Unless otherwise speci ed the letter will always denote abducible formulas. The following property was called in 8] the factorization property.
Fact B.5 ( 8] ) Let j be any abductive rational relation, then for every abducible formulas and 0 one of the following holds: 2 _ 3 ) . And, again since N 1 j= C( 1 ), and N 1 < N 2 then it must be the case N 2 6 j= C( 1 _ 2 _ 3 ), which is a contradiction.
Suppose N 3 j= C( 1 _ 3 ) and let 2 be such that N 2 j= C( 2 ). Since N 2 < N 3 then N 2 j= C( 1 _ 2 _ 3 ). But since N 1 < N 2 and N 1 j= C( 1 ) then it must be the case that N 2 6 j= C( 1 _ 2 _ 3 ) which is a contradiction. 2 Fact B.11 The relation = is an equivalence relation. 2 We extend to a pre-order over all models of as follows: If N is normal and M is a not normal model of , then N < M and every two non-normal models of are = . It is clear that the extended relation is a total pre-order. Let then W = (S; l; ) as de ned in 3.2 using the pre-ordering . We will show next that j =j W .
First, we show that for any we have Mod(C( )) = Min(Mod( f g); )
in particular this says that for 2 S, Mod(C( )) = l( ). Notice that when is not consistent with there is nothing to show because from the assumption about consistency preservation in this case ?2 C( ). So we can assume that 2 S. Let Normal( ) be the collection of all normal models of (from the remark above, for every abducible formula Theorem 2.13: Let ( ; Ab) be an abductive framework and j a consequence relation.
The following are equivalent:
(i) j satis es the rules of system CM (i.e. it is a cumulative monotonic relation), the rule Ab-Or, the abductive axiom, Ab-consistency and the following constraint: For every 2 and every , j .
(iii) There is a domain theory 0 such that for every abducible formula , f g is consistent if and only if 0 f g is consistent, and j =` 0 . Proof: (i) ) (ii) : Since Monotony clearly implies Rational Monotony and Loop (recall that transitivity follows from monotonicity in the system C 15]), then from Theorem 3.5 we know there is a total pre-order over Mod( ) such that for the corresponding abductive model W = (S; l; ) we have j =j W . We will show that is the empty relation and l has the desired properties.
(a) Let 1 , 2 2 S, we claim that 1 _ 2 6 j : i , i = 1; 2. Otherwise, towards a contradiction, suppose 1 _ 2 j : 1 , then by transitivity 1 j : 1 , hence 1 j ?, which contradicts the hypothesis of preservation of consistency for abducible formulas. Therefore, as in Fact B.5, we obtain C( 1 _ 2 ) = C( 1 ) \ C( 2 ). From Fact B.3 we know that Mod(C( )) = l( ) for every 2 for every abducible formula we easily see that 2 S if and only if f g is consistent, and also, if and only if 0 f g is consistent. We only need to show that for every 2 S, l( ) = Mod( 0 f g). One direction is obvious from the de nition. For the other direction, let N j= 0 f g, then for some 0 2 S we have that N 2 l( 0 ). Then from hypothesis in (ii) we obtain that N 2 l( ). 2 Theorem 2.13
